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GOVERNM ENT HOUSING: Rents, Allowances, Purposes, G randfather 
Clauses and All That
(An aide m em oire)
I.
INTRODUCTION: COLONIAL, TOWARD COMPREHENSIVE, TO CHAOTIC
1. The present system (or at any rate situation) of providing housing for some public 
servants at varying rates for a variety of purposes is unsatisfactory. It is neither 
equitable, conducive to public service salary rehabilitation with transparency nor fiscally 
efficient.
2. The present is the result of three historical tendencies one archaic, one abandoned as 
fiscally unsustainable and one very erratically implemented:
a. provision of housing for expatriate officers (initially colonial) who were by 
definition transient as to Tanganyika (as it then was) and mobile from place to place 
within it and its initial continuation on the (unexamined) premise that senior 
Tanzanian civil servants would both move often and want to retire to rural 
(Tanganyika under 5% estimated urbanisation at end of 1950’s) home not to urban 
area.
b. a brief attempt to provide housing for all public servants at 5% (low pay), 10% 
(medium) or 15% (high) of salary in the early to mid 1970’s was never by any means 
fully implemented and was abandoned as fiscally impracticable. (This was part of a 
broader strategic objective of having all large employers provide fair price/affordable 
housing to all employees. This arose in part because the Acquisition of Buildings Act 
had a seriously negative effect on availability of private rental housing above the 
Swahili compound house level and because neither fiscal considerations nor their 
quality of management made the National Housing Corporation nor the Registrar of
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Buildings plausible central instruments for expanding the national middle and upper
income housing stock.)
c. provision of housing where it was clearly in the employer’s interest (i.e. the
Government’s as employer) to do so, e.g. for:
a. uniformed services
b. isolated posts
c. (sporadically or spasmodically) rural and small town units with little access to 
rental housing
d. officers on transfer while seeking new accommodation.
The first was - at one time - achieved as, in general, was the second but not the third. The 
last has usually been dealt with by paying accommodation costs (or a fixed sum toward 
them) rather than by literal provision of housing.
3. For a limited number of positions - especially Ministers, High Court Judges, Resident 
Magistrates, top Uniformed Service Officers, Permanent Secretaries, Regional 
Commissioners and District Commissioners the prestige of the office requiring a house 
of some substance has been a substantial factor. It has become combined with providing 
an incentive to seek promotion in a salary scale structure which provided real, but rather 
small, increments at the top. Because all such officers were already housed under the 
colonial regime, this case of protecting the prestige of the office by providing a 
substantial house to the officer has rarely been addressed explicitly.
4. The present situation - except for the last (prestige of office) category - is chaotic. Not 
all officers whom the “good of the service” (i.e. effective conduct of public business) 
would suggest should be housed are housed. Indeed which categories should be housed 
for this reason has not been coherently articulated. Universality has been dropped. 
Housing eligibility (as opposed to entitlement) as an incentive has been retained, but with 
a restricted housing pool (and limited, if any, resources to expand it) has become 
something of a lottery and has increasingly created both unsatisfactory high incentives to
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‘winners’ and irrationalities in effective pay among housed and unhoused of similar 
seniority.
5. Payment for housing has also become chaotic - at least in terms of rationale and of 
burden on general resources. If housing is provided to support the prestige of the office, a 
case can he made for a sub-market rent (though not necessarily no rent as is currently the 
case of most of the categories listed at Para 3). For non-uniformed personnel, general 
good of the service housing should be subject to some charge because its provision is to 
ensure that rental housing which is adequate and affordable is to hand where otherwise it 
would not be and therefore is providing a house comparable to what an officer might rent 
in a larger town. To the mid 1970's the charging provisions were intended to cover 
operating and maintenance costs and - at senior and middle levels - to provide some 
relatively vaguely defined contribution toward capital cost. In the early 1970’s the 
5%-10%-15% (low, middle, high pay) of salary charge did do this. Indeed many upper 
middle and senior officers preferred not to occupy government housing, but rather to take 
out mortgage loans and build their own houses to provide either a retirement home and/or 
an appreciating asset which could be rented during transfers to other posts and sold (to 
finance inter alia building or purchase of a retirement residence in the officer’s home 
area) on retirement. It should perhaps be noted that housing provisions for a proportion 
of salary were (because of the high proportion of expatriates) general for large employers 
both in the colonial period and - at least for expatriates - remain common to date. With 
the erosion of real salaries and the more rapid rise of construction and of at least middle 
and high quality housing rents (excluding the low rent, lower maintenance NHC,
Registrar of Buildings stocks) the real public servant housing charge has fallen 
dramatically relative to market rents, to the cost of building officer owned houses and to 
the cost of maintenance resulting in a very large (and very uneven) subsidy element. 
(The reduction of the charge for top officers from 15% to 10% was a straight subsidy 
element to offset static nominal/falling real wages in mid 1980s.)
6. In general terms the reduction in real rental incomes has increased the problem of 
funding maintenance and management of government housing. However, the link is 
relatively vague because there never was a direct allocation of charges to costs and 
maintenance more broadly has been cut disproportionately because in the short term
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it appears to be (and i f  catch-up higher allocations restore the situation within 2 to 3 years 
actually is) an ‘easy’ way to improve cash flow or ‘balance’ a precarious ministerial 
budget. (The Treasury has historically not been keen on disproportionate maintenance 
cuts believing they stored up higher future costs. In 1974/75 it agreed to them as a short 
term device and in 1975/76 and 1976/77 sought to provide catch-up funding, but from 
1980/81 sustained fiscal pressures have ‘forced’ serious undermaintenance).
7. An historic - and presumably no longer relevant - special consideration arose out of 
the Leadership Code and the Acquisition of (Rented) Buildings Act. These in effect 
barred officers from building their own homes and renting them while on transfer because 
they barred rental incomes for leaders and, indeed, in the case of the latter Act, sought to 
eradicate oppressive landlordism by eliminating the middle and upper quality private 
rental housing market. However, this effect was relatively brief:
a. provisions were made to allow officers owning urban homes to ‘rent’ them to the 
government while on transfer in return for free provision of comparable 
accommodation in the new posting (an increasingly dubious arrangement after 1980 
as maintenance deteriorated); and
b. in practice rental of a single residence at least nominally intended primarily/ultimately 
for owner occupation came relatively rapidly to be accepted as within the meaning, if 
not the letter, of the Leadership Code.
In the event the Zanzibar Declaration (appropriately named in the sense that the Zanzibar 
leadership never agreed with, nor operated, the Arusha Leadership Code) ended the 
Leadership Code restraint and the private rental housing market re-emerged rapidly 
from the m id-1980’s with no serious efforts to regulate it, much less to constrain its 
expansion.
8. From the late 1980’s the rapid growth of allowances to alleviate low pay, to disguise 
growing inequalities in pay levels while slowing erosion of real professional pay and 
to limit tax actually paid (albeit only by evading the actual provisions of the Act) used 
the continued provision of housing at a decreasing fraction of its true value as a key 
element. (This was not unique to Tanzania nor to the government. Indeed - presumably 
primarily because of tax considerations - it was far more blatant in the enterprise and
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autonomous public entity, e.g. university, sectors.) By the early 1990’s a proliferation of 
allowances from housing through transport and public utilities to trip and ‘responsibility’ 
had become the dominant element in remuneration at the top of the pay structure (in the 
public servant sector, in large private and solvent public enterprises the allowances nets 
encompassed many or even all employees and in sum frequently were up to three times 
base pay.) By the mid 1990’s the general allowance pattern was perceived as unsound:
a. it prevented transparency and created illogicalities and inequities in remuneration;
b. because public service allowances (being in large part devised by senior public 
servants to alleviate their loss of real income) were concentrated at the top they 
increased real ratios of top to middle to low level pay in the public service and did so 
in hidden ways and - arguably - irrational, inequitable and inconsistent ones.
c. some allowances (albeit not in general subsidising of housing by sub-market charges 
related to pay) were open to serious abuse;
d. the supposed tax saving on most allowances (excluding government housing which 
was under an approved scheme but including university, parastatal enterprise and 
private sector housing provision, and almost all other significant allowances) was 
evasion under the very clear provisions of the 1972 Income Tax Act which - after 
years of non enforcement and apparent non comprehension - the Revenue Authority 
suddenly began enforcing in the second half of 1997;
e. most employees would prefer a transparent basic after tax pay useable as they 
desire to an equal package a high proportion of which was a grab-bag of special 
limited use (unless tacitly approved or unsupervised ‘wider’ use was permitted) 
allowances. (Evidently if the choice is an allowance or nothing they opt for the 
former.)
f. with the beginning of the end of tax ‘savings’ via allowances employers have (or 
soon will have) no evident economic reason to provide non transparent, specified 
allowance packages instead of pay except perhaps for expatriates.
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As a result most public service (including autonomous entity - e.g. university) allowances 
- except housing - have been bought out. The results - on paper albeit not, barring 
mistakes, at real post tax remuneration level - have often been very large, e.g. in some 
university cases under a third of total gross pay represented salary, even excluding 
housing ‘allowance’. ‘Transport’ allowance alone was larger than basic salary and 
‘responsibility’, teaching (sic!), utilities, watchmen’s, entertainment and other allowances 
added up to almost as much. Buyout required an over two thirds increase in gross pay to 
offset additional tax (the university had - apparently in its case in genuine ignorance - 
been evading tax on allowances like virtually all other employers). Because housing 
allowance (whether literal or via free or subsidised provision) was - or was perceived to 
be - less costly to employers (in comparisons to a similar net cash payment), employers 
often had housing stocks and the problems of conversion were (or were perceived to be) 
massive. Housing ‘allowances’ in the state sector have not to date been bought out 
for that reason and because since housing provision is not uniform among or within 
comparable grades, any scale increase would create either gainers and losers or huge 
gainers and break eveners (previously unhoused compared with previously housed).
9. The picture of chaos and of lack of system presented by the above sketch represents a 
reality of chaos. The system - if it can be called a system - is generally viewed (except by 
some beneficiaries) as unsatisfactory on almost all counts. Change has been hard to 
achieve because:
a. simply ending provision of housing would have reduced already dangerously low 
civil service real remuneration radically; and
b. would have left the government with a large number of - in general - ill 
maintained buildings unlettable at market rents thought to be not easily saleable 
at one go except at 'give away' prices and not manageable commercially by any 
existing public sector body;
c. charging either market rents or maintenance and management costs plus a 
contribution toward replacement cost rents - apart from the problems of valuing 
buildings to ensure some equity among very different quality residences - would have 
had similar real remuneration reducing impact to ceasing to provide housing;
6
d. the Uganda experience of raising pay - at least nominally to allow ending subsidised 
housing provision - parallel to selling housing at market prices with a preference to 
occupiers did not work well at least as perceived by public servants (in Tanzania as 
well as Uganda). Officers could not afford to buy and reside because mortgage 
interest and repayment often exceeded total pay on the new scales. In practice they 
could - and did - buy and resell making a profit but moving to far poorer 
accommodation (in some - presumably atypical - cases the garages or ‘servants’ 
quarters’ of their old residences). Further the lump sum profits from the sales and 
from voluntary early retirement apparently were a substantial contributing factor to 
very high levels o f loss o f competent professionals needed by - not surplus to - a 
reformed public service;
e. straight buyouts which put the public servant in the same real position after the end 
of housing provision (or its provision at market rents) would result in wildly skewed 
pay structures. (Even with less than full buyout, Uganda’s scale variance from 
messenger to Permanent Secretary is 40:1 vs. 13:1 in Tanzania. There is a huge gap 
between the top 1 to 4 persons in Ministries and the next grades of professionals.) 
Further because not all eligible officers were housed and not all categories 
logically eligible were in fact covered grave inequities for individual public servants 
or sub-categories would have been inevitable. (The losers could have been 
compensated by scales assuming all eligible officers were housed and all comparable 
categories covered, but only at an unmanageable fiscal cost and large windfall gains to 
500 to 1,000 officers.) As a result while other allowances (other than cost 
reimbursement and analogous cases) have been ‘bought out’, housing has - quite 
sensibly - been set to one side for further examination.
10. In brief from the mid 1990’s the government servant housing provision and charging 
arrangements have been perceived as:
a. totally unsatisfactory to most public servants, transparent remuneration structures, 
the conduct of public business and regaining/sustaining fiscal balance;
b. not readily alterable in any structural way without radical (and hard to work through 
in detail) transitional costs;
7
c. resulting in postponing action.
That can hardly be a desirable permanent position.
II.
HOUSING PROVISION IN TRANSITION: DEFINING OBJECTIVES
11. There are three quite distinct problems embedded in the present housing provision and 
changing (or subsidising) situation:
a. defining and moving toward coherent, feasible, desirable targets in respect to
public (government and/or community) provision of housing for specified categories 
of public servants;
b. articulating an appropriate charge structure for such housing;
c. avoiding massive negative side effects to public service morale and productivity, to 
regaining fiscal balance and/or to public sector housing management and maintenance 
during the transitional process.
12. The third objective cannot - at least logically - be attained without some prior 
definition o f the first two. That may appear self evident, but the present civil service 
reform process in Tanzania demonstrates that there is a real danger of initiating transition 
without an adequate identification and articulation of transition to what. It began with 
the purpose of reducing the number of public servants primarily on fiscal grounds, but 
with an underlying assumption that there were too many either because some categories 
were initially overstaffed or because reduced state economic ownership and intervention 
would reduce numbers needed. It added the goal of restoring real public service 
emoluments on the basis that an ‘enabling state’ needed a productive, professional public 
service, which was not possible without a living wage (somewhat vaguely conceptualised 
as more or less 1973 real wage and salary levels and ranges). Substantial progress has 
been made in reducing numbers (continuing an episodic but ongoing 1974 - 1990 process) 
and toward restoring 1973 real pay levels and ranges (a continuing - if by no means
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cumulatively progressed toward - goal from 1980). However, three glaring gaps have 
emerged:
a. no adequate articulated estimates of numbers, categories, duties and career long
(preservice, inservice, and refresher/upgrading) training have been developed; nor
b. have there been politically, socially, fiscally acceptable phasing solutions 
diagnosed for moving from the levels of service now provided. E.g. universal 
access services; primary health; primary and continuing education; pure, accessible 
water; rural extension services [agricultural, veterinary, forestry]; rural roads and 
postal services are all well below 100% access with no phased, input costed, training 
specified programmes for bringing term to or near to 100% at some finite time. Nor 
are there targets for building other services to at least medium (5 year) to relatively 
long (10 year) acceptable levels; and
c. the acceptance in principle that pay alone is not enough without discipline, 
operational systems, personnel management (e.g. training/retraining) and parallel 
provision of operating inputs and mobility to do the job has not been matched by 
coordinated action targeted to improved performance in those fields.
13. This apparently curious approach to achieving transition through massive structural
reforms without prior specification (except in the vaguest of terms) of transition to what is 
in fact a result o f m anaging - or trying to manage - continuous crises and seeking both 
to avert systemic collapse and to attain at least marginal clawback. In that 
perspective it is not simply understandable but also potentially part of the answer. To 
have spent 1995 - 1997 debating optimal 2005 pay levels, standing orders and public 
personnel markets and job  descriptions instead of taking initial steps to raise real pay, 
establish rational and transparent pay relativities, begin refresher training (e.g. in primary 
health and education), do a first revision of standing orders, posit that at lease in health, 
education and police future personnel requirements will rise so no more attrition by non 
replacement should take place would have been disastrous. However, the progress 
made now needs to bolstered by action on the gap areas if it is to be sustained and 
developed. The present purpose is to outline how this could be done in respect to 
housing.
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14. Public sector housing provision for public servants is a necessity. However, the 
normal means should be for the public sector to pay them adequately to rent or to buy
(e.g. via mortgages perhaps guaranteed by their employer) suitable housing not by 
physical provision of housing, still less by providing it free or below cost as a portion of 
emoluments.
15. However, in some cases public interest may best be furthered by physical provision of 
housing. Prestige of office (not officers), availability at all hours, actual lack of 
availability of alternative appropriate accommodation (especially in isolated and rural 
areas), facilitating the efficient use of short term personnel (e.g. expatriates but also 
citizen specialists on defined, term work) and avoiding transitional loss of productivity 
when public servants are transferred are such cases. May is the operative word as other 
approaches may be equally or more suitable e.g. community assistance in rural (especially 
village and ward level) official house construction and maintenance, encouragement of 
middle cost housing development by block rental and/or guaranteed mortgage schemes, 
facilitating prompt, simple expatriate house leasing by supplier agencies.
16. Even if government provision of housing is appropriate, there is no automatic 
assumption a pool of state managed residences, quarters and estates is appropriate.
Because the state does now own a number of houses, quarters and estates (and because 
quarters are not realistically privatisable or autonomiseable) substantial government 
ownership is likely. However, the possibility of contract management and 
maintenance of estates, perhaps some quarters and substantial clusters of houses 
(especially in cities and large towns) should be explored. The government has no evident 
comparative advantage in estate management and it is a specialised, time consuming 
operation. Further by avoiding hidden deferral (or ‘overlooking’) of maintenance, the 
contractual form might well facilitate better maintenance and, therefore greater user 
friendliness (and lower cloudburst budget bills for rehabilitation!).
17. A related issue - or alternative route to enabling public servants to house themselves out 
of salaries is facilitating access to mortgages - e.g. by guarantees and/or a scheme 
channelling Post Office Savings Bank or NIC funds at rates above their deposit rates and 
analogous to government security rates. Any such scheme is likely to be sustainable only 
if inflation remains below 15% (preferably below 10%).
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IS. Appropriate charges for public servant housing are not self evident. The answer of 
‘market rates' is unhelpful. If it is correct for all or some cases (as it surely is for many) 
then the government should not be providing the housing but rather the salary levels 
allowing officers to rent (or build). If housing is provided - as suggested above - when a 
special public interest is involved there is a case for some element of ‘discounting’ from 
the market rate even assuming the later is a meaningful term.
19. For housing other than quarters, the logical approach to avoid highly complex
calculations for each case might be to set rents at that per cent of salaries which a 
sample survey of urban employees (government, enterprise, self employed) indicates is 
‘typical’, this is usually estimated at 20% albeit that is often a share of household 
income with most households having more than one earning stream. As a first 
approximation, 20% of salary might be an initial target for public servant housing directly 
provided by central government. (If it is seen as too high by some public servants they 
are free to house themselves.) It would certainly be a plausible rate for new entrants 
into general urban government housing. Three cases for exceptions/discounts exist:
a. quarters since these are probably not desired by most employees, but are required to 
meet employer needs. A discount to 15% (or even 10%?) might be arguable;
b. housing in isolated or rural/small town areas in which there is no realistic access to 
reasonable price/reasonable quality rental accommodation. Here there is no open 
and shut case for a discount assuming satisfactory structural and maintenance levels. 
But isolated, rural and small town posts are ones many officers view as less attractive 
so a 15% rate as an incentive to boost morale might be suitable;
c. housing provided to demonstrate/protect the image and prestige of the office (not 
the officer) - Head of State, Ministers, Higher Judiciary, Senior Uniformed Officers, 
Permanent Secretaries, Regional and District Commissioners. Here there is no self 
evident reason to provide a subsidy. The job description de facto  involves a residence 
with some access and the purpose of providing the housing is (or ought to be) a 
guarantee that it will be adequate or above in size and quality. However, if the office’s 
prestige is seen to require a larger/higher standard building than the officer would 
choose to pay for out of his own income that is a case for subsidisation. If this
11
category is narrowly drawn it probably can be held to 250 - 300 officers (half D C ’s) 
so can be treated as exceptional without major fiscal or pay scale transparency 
problems. Except for the Head of State, Chief Justice, Head of Armed Forces (and 
these only because of international practice) no very convincing reason exists for 
below 20% charges (especially for officers not required to live in government 
housing) but the costs - whether fiscal or managerial or morale - of a tightly limited 
exceptional category may also be rather low. (The 20% deals with the case of housing 
above the standard the officer would choose to obtain from his/her own resources.)
20. Transitional provisions are necessary for three reasons:
a. the implicit subsidy from 10% of salary charges (or free housing) is substantial and 
would need to be bought out;
b. buyout would be messy both because it would widen the range of headline salaries 
and because not all officers in comparable grades (or even the same grade) do in 
practice live in government houses;
c. botched transitions could have serious morale and undesired professional attrition 
results (as in Uganda).
21. The simplest solution would appear to be use of the ‘grandfather clause’ approach as
was used for civil service salaries at the time of the immediate post colonial scale
revisions (reductions):
a. persons now occupying free housing could continue to do so until retirement;
b. persons occupying 10% housing could likewise do so until retirement but if 
promoted to a currently free housing entitled post would then be charged 
whatever proportion of salary is set for that post or 10% whichever is less;
c. new entrants into government housing would pay on the new rates (e.g. as 
proposed in the preceding paragraphs).
22. The benefits of this approach are:
a. there are no losers of current acquired ‘rights’ i.e. no officer loses present rights;
b. the problem will solve itself in a finite period as ‘grandfather clause’ beneficiaries 
retire, resign and/or die. Many ‘free’ holders are within five years of retirement and 
most others as well as most ‘10%’ ones are within 10 years of retirement. The largest 
exception to this age pattern may be DCs;
c. the emphasis can therefore be on setting appropriate future rates while setting 
aside unravelling results of past decisions to erode with time.
23. No very serious fiscal or equity challenges can be made. Buyouts would (if truly loss 
offsetting) cost at least as much as ‘grandfathering’. What is provided is not a new gain 
but avoidance of loss. Even if the present holders nearing retirement can be seen as better 
remunerated than their successors now, it can also be argued that they have spent two 
decades (1977 - 1996) on low and deteriorating real emolument scales so that a certain 
case for favourable treatment arises. This solution looks messy but is not really as 
complicated or as messy as it looks. The categories ‘grandfathered’ and the officers in 
them are defined from the start (certainty and no new entries); will fall to negligible 
numbers in 10 years and to zero in little over 15; do not create barriers to predictable 
gains from promotion and/or scale enhancement to those not within the coverage of the 
‘grandfather clause’.
24. The 5% of salary rent charge (low income) category may need treatment. However, 
the number of low income urban public servants (other, perhaps than those in the 
uniformed services required to reside at place of work) is believed to be negligible. The 
5% cases are presumably concentrated up country in small town, rural and border post 
pockets and even these may not be significant numerically. If these assumptions are 
correct a 20% (new entry) urban charge poses no problems as no low pay scale urban 
public servant (except a constable or a private) expects to be housed and the grandfather 
clause (5% in this case) covers historic exceptions. In the up country cases the 15% or 
10% rate would usually apply to new entrants - again probably not a serious problem if, as 




PUBLIC SERVICE HOUSING, MORALE, PERFORMANCE
25. Public servants need adequate housing for themselves and their families if they are to 
be at work on time and not worn out from travel and if their morale is to be high. Both 
factors effect performance so that the government’s duty as a good employer (which in 
recent years it has not been) is in its own interest.
26. However, that duty creates no presumption that the government should in general 
physically provide or subsidise public service housing. The basic way to provide 
employee housing is by paying salaries adequate for employers to rent, buy or build.
After all public servants and their families need to be properly fed and clothed but no one 
seriously suggests doing so by free food and clothing (other than required official 
uniforms) allowances!
27. Direct provision has at least three drawbacks:
a. significant capital requirements to provide a housing pool;
b. major financial and managerial burdens to administer and to maintain houses 
and to collect rents (even when the latter is done by check-off deductions from 
salaries);
c. a limitation on employee ability to choose - household housing needs and 
preferences among housing and other goods do vary.
28. Housing subsidies if provided by actual premises at below market rents are a form of 
direct provision. If provided by meeting a portion of rents they are open to the same 
criticism as to choice and add to obscurity and unintended inequality in total emoluments.
29. If adequate pay is provided public servants can and do rent, build or buy. In
Tanzania to the late 1970’s most did so without insurmountable problems. A majority 
rented partly because they did not plan to retire at place of work or were moderately often 
transferred. However some (even including eligible officers) chose to build whether to 
reside after retirement or to have an appreciating asset to sell. Commutations used for
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pension in large part went to buying/building houses. For supporting staff and clerks 
commutation to building or enlarging a Swahili compound house and renting rooms was a 
common retirement strategy. The provided houses were in large part an eroding heritage 
of the short stay (at least in one location) expatriate senior officer cadre of the colonial 
service plus prestige of post, convenience of employer and lack of rental housing in 
certain locations elements.
30. At that point employee housing was not a central issue for either public service 
employees or the government. Nor did most public servants perceive themselves as 
hopelessly ill housed. The worsening of the situation over the period from 1979 relates 
primarily to erosion o f real pay and to housing costs (certainly for building and - 
perhaps less markedly for renting) rising faster than the general cost of living index.
NHC and RoB housing had lower rent increases (until recently), but was exceedingly ill 
maintained while government provided/salary related rent housing covered a small (and 
apparently from the late 1970’s declining) proportion of public servants.
31. The route to a new strategy for public service household housing can - and should - be 
based on:
a. adequate pay to allow public servants to rent, buy or build;
b. facilitating public servant access to mortgage finance;
c. continuing pension commutation provisions facilitating building or buying at 
time or retirement.
32. Of these elements the first and third are relatively simple and self explanatory. The 
second require a more articulated sketch and an explanation of why it is needed in 
Tanzania as a result of finance market imperfections and uncertainties:
a. only if financial institution gains and government losses are equal or the latter larger is 
there a clear case against government guarantees of public servant mortgage 
loans. In fact lender gains (including perceived and real risk reduction) are likely to 
be large and government costs/risks low;
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b. only in deep, articulated financial markets with specialised mortgage lenders who 
have a history of substantial, successful transactions is access - at least at interest rates 
not including a very high risk premium - likely to be available to the majority of 
public servants.
In other words, government involvement in mortgage guarantee provisions and collection 
check-off systems can reduce net transaction costs to the benefit of lenders and 
borrowers without necessitating any substantial government subsidy.
33. Given low or moderate inflation, adequate pay and financial institutions which do 
undertake individual mortgage business, there is no inherent problem to officers’ 
borrowing to buy or to build and paying off their loan over time to own their homes clear 
of debt at retirement. They can then live in them in retirement or sell them to cover the 
cost of a home area retirement home/shamba. Under such conditions no very evident 
need for state involvement exists.
34. However, in Tanzania none of the above conditions has existed since the mid 1970’s.
The first two - inflation at under 15% and preferably single digit; adequate emoluments - 
are in the process of being regained even if the trend is still fragile. The third is more 
problematic.
35. Therefore a government facilitated mortgage scheme - e.g. by POSB and/or NIC but 
open to any interested financial institution - might be useful. There is no case for 
subsidising it, but there is a case for guarantees and ’check-off of payment to the 
mortgage provider from salary. Given the regularity of monthly salaries and the security 
of accrued pension rights, such provisions should not involve much administrative 
difficulty nor cost to the state. They would lower the cost of collection and the risk of 
loss to the lender substantially and so constitute a ‘win-win: measure.
36. The economic objection to loan guarantees is that they reduce lender attention to 
borrower assessment and loan management. Therefore, a partial - say 80% - guarantee 
(risk sharing) might be preferable to 100%.
37. The parameters of a mortgage scheme might include:
a. eligibility after 2 years of service;
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b. 25 years (or period to 55 if less) mortgages;
c. interest at 3% above government 10 year bond (or, if no such paper is being issued 
the two year note or 180 day Treasury bill rate) perhaps subject to a floor of 10% and 
a ceiling of 20%;
d. a maximum (not automatic) level of two times annual salary subject to a maximum  
initial annual payment obligation of 25% or 30% of gross basic salary.
38. The interest rate assumes government securities (whether fixed or floating rate) pay 
slightly  above the rate of inflation and that with check-off and guarantee the costs of loan 
management and collection plus risk of loss are under 2% a year over the life of the 
mortgage. Low risk lending giving a net rate of return above the rate of inflation (and of 
government paper) is usually attractive to institutions such as Post Office Saving Banks 
and insurance companies and - perhaps - to pension funds.
39. The (initial) servicing limit of 25% (or 30%) of salary is in the interests of prudence. It 
would not be automatic but subject to lender assessment. The two times annual pay (now 
say about Shi million to Shl2 .5  million) needs to be checked against actual costs of 
houses constructed by small to medium contractors (or fundi teams) under owner 
supervision and the cost of used houses of varying sizes/qualities. These are not well 
known so a survey contracted to a local consultant would be needed.
40. Assuming:
a. real salaries are sustained and gradually restored to 1973 real levels (and 
ultimately above);
b. inflation rarely exceeds 15% a year;
c. increments and promotions result in individual (as opposed to average) real salary 
rising - on average - 5% a year (plus inflation); then
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The scheme is viable to all parties. If “a” is not met it is likely to be viable to nobody. If 
“b” is not it will be disastrous for borrowers, “c” is less essential but would facilitate 
supplementary borrowing for home improvement/extension as family size and public 
service rank grew.
For example an officer on Sh 100,000 a month could:
a. borrow Sh2,000,000 (nominally Sh2,500,000 would be allowable but with the 
assumed inflation/interest rates that results in too high an initial servicing/salary rates 
i.e. about 40% of salary);
b. with interest at - say - 18% (15% inflation)
c. on an equal monthly payment over the life of the mortgage, subject to at least full 
interest paid each year, interest and principal would be about Sh360,000 in the 
first year or 30% of pay;
d. subsequently while the absolute payment will rise (the level at c is interest only) 
the ratio to gross salary will fall especially if inflation remains in the 10% to 15% 
range and real pay is sustained because of incremental scale and promotion 
effects.
41. Evidently it is the lender’s business to set up procedures to assure the loan is used to build 
a house - e.g. instalment release and spot checks on progress - and to secure legal (e.g. 
land registration endorsement) documentation to ensure security of claim. That is, 
however, normal to all mortgage lending not special to the proposed scheme.
42. Intent to live in the house should be a condition - as, more important, should be adequate 
maintenance and prompt payment of land rents/improvement rates. But especially if the 
officer is transferred to another station, no absolute barrier should be established to 
renting part or all of the premises. (The mortgage ceiling prevents an officer using the 
scheme to set up as a full time landlord.)
43. It can quite correctly be said that housing is basically a household cost and that total 
household income (not that of one worker) is the appropriate magnitude to relate to 
mortgage service costs. That is true, but the government cannot establish checkoff
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systems for, have pension accrued security relative to, nor even know with much accuracy 
(at acceptable cost) non-public service incomes of public servants’households. By the 
same token, however, if two or more spouses are public servants (more applying in cases 
- presumably very few - under civil, Islamic or customary law in which three or more 
members of a marriage are in the public service) each should be eligible to take out a 
mortgage related to their emoluments toward a residential house or compound. Two 
gender points arise:
a. female employees should be eligible for mortgage access on the same terms and 
conditions as male;
b. provisions need to be taken in respect to results of divorce to protect the lender 
(both parties must fulfil commitment) and to protect each spouse up to their mortgage 
service (interest and debt) contribution. The former can be in the mortgage terms; the 
latter may require amendment to the Marriage Act since divorce settlements under 
Customary and Islamic Law might not provide that safeguard. To enforce it is not to 
denigrate Islamic or Customary Law but to give uniform effect to the fact that 
mortgages (and their post divorce financial obligations) are creations of Civil 
Financial Contract Law not Community Family Law.
IV. 
MARKET FAILURE, PUBLIC INTEREST AND GOVERNMENT PROVISION
44. The instances in which there may be a case for the government (central or local) or user 
(as communities or service user groups) to provide housing or physical/financial 
assistance toward its provision are three:
a. employees whose housing is seen to reflect on the office e.g. Minister, Judges, 
Uniformed Service Commanders, Regional and District Commissioners, Permanent 
Secretaries and Autonomous Agency (e.g. Central Bank, University) Heads;
b. employees whose work entails their residence at or near workplace with particular 
reference to the uniformed services;
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c. employees in isolated, rural and other limited rental housing market locations in 
which adequate pay is not a sufficient condition for employee procurement of 
adequate housing.
45. The first category has a certain reality - if only because of near universal global practice - 
at very senior levels. As Tanzania has usually allowed holders of such posts to opt out of 
state housing (as did President Nyerere, several senior ministers and nearly half of 
permanent secretaries in the late 1960s - early 1970s) the real importance of housing (as 
opposed to offices) in protecting the prestige of a post is open to question. The best 
arguments may be for uniformed service senior officers (really a special ‘reside at place of 
work’ case) and for District and Regional Commissioners (who do tend to be moved 
frequently, in the case of many DCs are in towns with limited middle or upper level rental 
housing availability and arguably verge on the reside at work category). By any 
reasonable definition this is a small category - perhaps up to 300 of whom half would be 
DCs and RCs.
46. Housing at place of work because of exigencies of service applies primarily to army, 
police, border post and perhaps some meteorological stations. In the case of isolated 
medical and educational units the case for housing provision flows more from lack of 
access to private sector rental accommodation than from a need to reside at the site of the 
employment unit.
47. It is not clear that all uniformed service personnel do need to reside at place of work in 
government provided quarters. There is a case for review - especially as at present not all 
are or can be so accommodated. In the case of police (and to a degree commissioned 
military officers) off-post housing is common in many countries particularly in urban 
areas. Traffic police for example are not likely to need to be instantly available 24 hours 
a day. However, adjustments when an entire service has in the past been treated as 
entitled to/required to reside in state housing need to take into account the need to avoid 
perceived as well as actual discrimination against ‘offbase’ personnel.
48. Tanzania has substantial private rental housing availability in cities and large towns but 
much less (or none at all) in small towns and rural areas. Where such market failure
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exists, specific attention to how public servants can have access to housing is needed. At
least five options exist:
a. encourage private sector construction for rent - unfortunately a long term and 
problematic solution in rural areas and a medium term one in towns;
b. encourage employees to take up mortgages and build- probably attractive only to 
employees from and expecting to stay/retire in their present place of posting (who 
may constitute a surprisingly high level of primary level education, health and 
extension personnel);
c. public housing authority, e.g. NHC, ROB, provision - an unattractive option in 
Tanzania given the extreme weakness of these bodies and their extremely poor 
maintenance record. While NPF and/or NIC provision might seem more attractive, 
the problems NPF has experienced with its initial property development projects 
suggest extreme caution as neither has real property development nor rental portfolio 
management experience.
d. exploring possibilities of provision of rental accommodation (and/or assistance in 
building/maintaining employee homes) by communities and/or organised service 
user groups - an adaptation of the policy of most units in the Tanzania Christian 
Social Services Commission Network and of the practice of Woreda (District) 
authorities in Ethiopia.
e. employer (central or local government) provision of housing presumably on a 
proportion of salary basis.
These are not exclusive - all may be useable in some situations and perhaps none is
appropriate to all.
49. Special considerations apply to:
a. short contract specialists (especially but not only expatriates);
b. officers on transfer.
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The former are analogous to the transient colonial service senior officers (even if they are 
citizens) in that self owned housing in brief stay posts is unlikely to be suitable and the 
problems of house hunting under unfamiliar conditions can seriously affect early period 
productivity. Officers on transfer need a period - preferably with their families - to locate 
satisfactory housing in their new location. Again loss of morale and productivity if forced 
to find somewhere to live under extreme time constraints can be serious.
50. Expatriates are now largely externally funded technical assistance personnel from or via 
foreign governments or international agencies with offices in Tanzania. The case for 
providing them, whether as part of salary or more usually by paying their rent, with 
housing is clear cut. But it should be - both financially and logistically - the 
responsibility of the provider, not of Tanzania.
51. Officers on transfer do need interim accommodation. The simplest approach is covering 
hotel costs, but that is hardly the least cost one. Provision of standard housing is unlikely 
to be practical and introduces “moral hazard” in that if acceptable family housing is 
provided the officer may not strive very hard to rent a house of his/her own. A possible 
approach would include:
a. provision of guest house style (rooms and access to kitchen) accommodation for 60 - 
or in exceptional cases 90 - days;
b. operating (in the Civil Service Department) an office collecting information on and 
providing advice in respect of for rent or sale houses/flats and on mortgage finance 
possibilities to facilitate officers’ searches.
The difficulty with that approach is that it would require building or buying guest houses 
and estimating typical numbers of officers on transfer. In any case it would probably need 
on occasion to be supplemented with hotel use.
52. If a housing policy within the above parameters for house provision is agreed, a pre 
implementation study would be needed:
a. to determine which posts needed official houses for the prestige of the post;
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b. and which portions of which services, in what locations required place of work 
accommodation (“quarters”) to perform their duties effectively;
c. how many rural or small town officers in which departments where should be 
provided with access to government or community provided housing or community 
assistance in building and maintaining their own;
d. how many present entitled/eligible urban houses are redundant under this approach 
and what should be done with them.
53. Clearly more rural/small town houses are likely to be found to be needed. Overall 
quarters may be adequate but probably not at all sites. (This assumes some police and 
army personnel do not need to live on post/in cantonment.) Probably the number of 
'prestige of office’ houses will prove to be adequate or to show a surplus. Clearly there 
will be an urban surplus - especially in Dar es Salaam - on previously entitled/eligible 
housing. The surplus cannot be used directly (as opposed to by sale and use of proceeds) 
to meet the deficit because it is in the wrong locations and, in general, of the wrong 
quality.
54. A case exists for selling surplus houses. However - unless the funds are desired to fund 
gap filling in respect to other housing categories - there is no immediate urgency as to 
disposal. An orderly approach might include:
a. identification of surplus dwellings;
b. valuation of the premises (taking account of the high average age and poor condition 
of a majority);
c. providing first refusal on the mortgage terms set out above to present occupants;
d. organising an orderly auction (subject to floor prices) of the balance of buildings.
As the total of surplus houses is unlikely to exceed 500 to 1,000 and their present 
(aged/poor condition) average value may well be Sh5m the potential sale value is unlikely 
to exceed Sh2,500 to Sh4,000 million of which probably a minimum of half would be in 
the form of mortgages (which however would presumably mean up front payment of 
lender cash to the government) - a useful but not a major fiscal inflow.
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55. Any likely approach to housing public servants will leave a substantial number of 
houses and quarters in government ownership and public servant occupancy. Even 
with a phasing out of the present eligible/entitled system a substantial urban housing pool 
will remain for up to ten years. The question therefore arises how and by whom these 
buildings should be managed and maintained. To date it has been more of less 
unquestioningly assumed to be the government via the staff of the Public Works 
Department as to maintenance and individual employment units via personnel 
departments so far as allocation is concerned. Both the assumption and the modalities are 
colonial regime inheritances. Interestingly the maintenance pattern - payments by user 
units to Works on a formula basis intended to cover costs taking one year with another - 
accepts the desirability of specialisation and of separating the personnel policy and 
building operation/maintenance elements of housing provision.
56. This precept could be pushed further. In urban areas there is no evident virtue in 
government agency operation of maintenance services unless these provide major real 
(not camouflaging non-maintenance as low cost) savings. For works to contract out 
clusters of residences to management-operation-maintenance contractors would 
make good sense, if it reduced sustainable costs or held them constant but also allowed 
reduction of attention needed to a peripheral activity. Whether reliable, cost efficient 
contractors would appear can only be determined by inviting inquiries and then tenders.
It also requires analysing ‘target’ cost because past skimping on maintenance means 
present allocations are unsustainably low.
57. However, it is unclear whether this contracting out approach is fully practicable for 
rural and small town housing built precisely because the local property market was 
narrow/underdeveloped. By and large absence of private landlords is likely to be 
paralleled by absence of private estate managers. The most realistic options may be:
a. Regional or District Works maintenance (the status quo) but with costs recalculated to 
a sustainable/full maintenance basis;
b. user committee or community maintenance either as local incentive to staff or as a 
negotiated “user fee’Vcost sharing item.
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58. Q u a rters  - despite an instinctive reverse assumption - are much like other houses for 
maintenance purposes. In general security aspects of most police or army housing 
maintenance are low and not very different if Works (or Army Engineering) or private 
contractors carry them on. The obvious distinction is - as with houses - urban in which 
contractors are likely to exist and rural/small town where they often do not. However, a 
special consideration may arise for the Army. There is a case for m il i ta r y  e n g in e e r in g  
capacity  and for keeping it available as to expertise and as to sustainable fiscal burden 
during peace periods by taking part in general civilian type engineering . As with the US 
Army Corps of Engineers in water management engineering and roads. If the needed 
capacity includes buildings construction and maintenance, then it is sensible for the 
Army’s own engineering units to maintain all its buildings - including quarters. Indeed if 
that work leaves spare capacity then Works should encourage the Army Engineers to bid 
for general maintenance - perhaps especially police quarters and rural/small town 
maintenance near military camps.
59. Prestige of office housing raises no real security issues - less so than quarters. In any 
case Works staff are not necessarily less corruptible than these of enterprise contractors. 
Doubtless received attitudes and international practice mean Presidential, Prime 
Ministerial, senior Uniformed Officer residences will be government maintained. Lack of 
suitable contractors will probably mean the same for most DC and some RC residences.
As a result no great difference will result if this category (strictly defined) is left with 
Works.
60. For employment units the proposed change (partial contracting out) would have few 
change requirements (except probably higher charges to buy better maintenance and, 
thus less occupier complaints). For W orks (which probably should collect and pay over 
the funds to contractors and certainly should engage and monitor contractors) there would 
be a partial shift from operation to hiring/monitoring but the same job to be done.
61. Charging is at present as devoid of any coherent rationale as provision. This is the result 
of an accumulation of historic events, of the divergent reasons for which housing is 
provided and of the lack of any coherent examination since the 5%-10%-15% formula at a 
time when 15% was an economic rent (and subsidised the 5%). The attempt to move to 
general public employer provision of housing on the same basis was - in retrospect -
25
probably always foredoomed and certainly became impracticable with the 1979 onward 
fiscal squeeze.
62. The simple and - at first glance - appealing approach is to charge “market rent”. 
However, that is only self evidently plausible if:
a. most employees can (not are required to take up government housing;
b. housing availability in respect to size and quality is such as to allow choice to renters;
c. determining what “market rent” would be is relatively simple and accurate.
None of these conditions is met in present or probable future Tanzania.
63. In respect to the entitled/eligible officer housing (which even if phased out will be 
substantial for some years and is at the heart of both criticisms and defences of the present 
situation) two rules of thumb can applied:
a. rents - for the sake of simplicity of administration set as a % of salary - should cover 
full operating/maintenance costs and some contribution toward replacement; and
b. should be at about the proportion of salary the ‘normal’ household outside 
government housing spends on rent. That % needs to be researched (by a
domestic consultant hired by Hazina-CSD-Works) but for purposes of preliminary 
analysis may be estimated at 20%.
The consequential issue of how to phase 10% and 0% to 20% is addressed below.
64. In respect to the special - rural/small town, quarters, prestige of office - housing the 
20% rule should be a maximum and out of pocket operating/maintenance cost a
minimum at least except for community/user provided housing. These types of housing 
are provided to suit employer needs, to fill gaps caused by market failure, to lend dignity 
to posts (not postholders). Therefore, pure market rents (even if determinable) are not 
appropriate. Being in quarters and living in small towns or rural areas are disincentives 
(or negative inducements) while prestige of post housing is dictated by ‘respect for office 
needs which are not directly related to the depth of the employee’s pockets. Arguably a 
‘reduction’ of rent to 15% of salary in the first two cases and holding to a 20% ceiling
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even if below operation/maintenance in the third would address these factors. (For the 
avoidance ot doubt security operating costs are a legitimate public expense not one to be 
clawed back in rent, just as if a President or Minister or Chief Justice chooses to live in 
his own home, capital costs of security installations should = and at present do - fall on 
the state not the individual.) In practice it is unknown to charge a head of state or 
government for his/her official residence so that President, Vice President, Prime Minister 
should perhaps be special surviving no rent cases on purely pragmatic grounds.
65. The foregoing analysis is of what is practicable and desirable for 1998-2008 and
probably longer not an attack on the early 1970’s strategy and articulation in the then 
existing context and not unreasonable projections. Until the early 1980’s a serious case 
could be made for it in terms of possibilities, constraints, equity:
a. consequential on the Acquisition of Buildings Act and the Leadership Code there was 
no dynamic private rental housing sector above the Swahili compound house level 
nor was it politically acceptable to promote one;
b. the NHC, RoB and Government had substantial housing stocks as did some large 
companies;
c. enterprise profitability and borrowing capacity and government revenue 
buoyancy and (then) available borrowing capacity were such as to permit 
expansion of employee housing so long as charges covered operating - 
maintenance - a contribution toward renewal;
d. the 5%-10%-15% (of salary) formula at that time did meet the cash 
operating/maintenance cost plus condition and was deliberately devised to do so (on a 
basis analogous to general provision Singapore public housing which was also cross 
subsidised;
e. there was no intent to require employees to rent. On balance there was a positive 
view of their borrowing/building. The THB did offer mortgage loans and housing 
costs were at levels allowing middle and senior level employees to take them up and 
service them. A social security type levy was introduced to fund a low income
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housing loan scheme for those using fundi led informal sector construction teams
to build modest houses in rural as well as urban areas;
f. so long as many (and a growing share) of large enterprise and government 
employers had access to employer owned housing and the 5%-10%-15% charging 
system was not a massive subsidy no very serious inequity, inconsistency or 
mismotivation consequences were likely.
66. Even in retrospect, the early 1970’s strategy does not look mad nor its articulation either
internally inconsistent nor marked by major gaps. But since 1980 it has not been
practicable and the remnant bits produce inequalities and inequities:
a. neither enterprises nor government have operating revenue flows nor access to 
borrowing adequate to provide general housing access to their employees;
b. the 5%-10%-15% formula (compressed to 5%-10% in an overt subsidisation 
measure) has a very heavy subsidy element (because real pay has fallen);
c. THB and other mortgage finance is not accessible to/serviceable by any low or 
middle or most upper income public servants;
d. the private rental housing market is much more dynamic and politically acceptable;
e. generalised employer provision of housing is no longer a goal - much less an 
operational targeted process;
f. the resultant housing pattern or non pattern (combined with de facto  subsidy) 
creates a host of anachronisms, inequalities, non-transparencies, inequities.
Thus the need for a full review and strategic reconceptualisation.
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V.
TOW ARD A REDEFINED STRATEGY: Interim and After
67. Parallel policy formulation and data collection exercises could result in two steps (new 
rental charges; “grandfather clause” transitional provisions) in the 1999/00 Budget and 
others (who is to be housed and why; mortgage access provisions; possible partial 
contracting out of management/maintenance; routes to disposing of surplus housing 
stock) roughly sketched by mid 1999 and approved for implementation from January 
or July 2000.
68. The rate proposals are likely to be fairly straightforward:
a. limited number of free houses e.g. President, Vice President, Prime Minister, Chief 
Justice;
b. larger but limited number of prestige of post housing entitlements at 15% of salary in 
District towns and 20% in Regional towns and Dar es Salaam - e.g. District 
Commissioners, Regional Commissioners, High Court Judges, Uniformed Service 
Commanders residing on base, Ministers;
c. 20% for new occupiers present eligible/entitled housing not in a-b-d until/unless its 
provision is discontinued;
d. 15% of salary for rural and small town housing provided by government in areas in 
which access to private sector rented housing is limited;
e. 15% for “quarters” family housing provided at place of work to meet employer needs 
for 24 hour availability. (Special considerations may apply to uniformed service 
quarters for historic reasons, albeit there is no particular logic in a rate below 15% in 
their case unless the quarters are of very poor quality. But see Annex.)
69. While comparative data on typical per cent of household income spent by (and 
size/quality of housing of) medium and large enterprise and of small and ‘informal’ (i.e. 
unrecorded) urban enterprise employees would be useful; it is unlikely it would lead to 
radically different initial rates. If 20% is significantly below the average, then
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adjustments over time parallel to real pay rehabilitation to - say - a 25% rate would 
probably be preferable to a 10% to 25% leap in 1999.
70. The appropriate time to alter rates would be in the Budget process parallel to annual pay 
scale adjustment. It is important - to ease negative impact of shifts on employees’ 
perceived financial position and morale and to minimise opposition - that in the year in 
which increases are taken (say 1999) the increase in salary scales be comparable to the 
past years COL inflation or - at the least - a realistic estimate of the next years increase.
71. To avoid significant loss to persons now enjoying premises at lower proportions of 
salary, a ‘grandfather’ clause should be provided in the new Rates Order (taken either as 
a Standing Order or some other type of Subsidiary Legislation):
a. present free housing holders to continue to pay no rent until retirement - or other 
departure from the public service - (but no new free entrants except for those covered 
by category 67a);
b. present 10% entitled and eligible housing holders should also keep the right to 
housing at that rate until retirement - or other departure from the public service - (but 
if promoted to presently free housing posts not covered by category 67a should pay 
10%);
c. present 5% occupiers (probably near 0 outside quarters or isolated posts) should 
enjoy similar safeguards.
72. The other areas in which new policies and mechanisms are needed included:
a. a mortgage facility for public servants on the lines set out in Paras. 36-42 above tied 
to a multiple of salary, 25 year repayment, interest rates linked to government debt, 
with government guarantees but with mortgages issued by POSB or NIC (with 
repayment from 20% of salary checkoff. For the avoidance of doubt it is assumed that 
the owner occupier deposit level would be low - say 5% - because of government’s 
ability to secure repayment automatically from salary. However, special provisions 
would be needed to provide for alteration of terms in the case of employees leaving 
the service before normal retirement and perhaps a declining balance term life
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assurance policy to finance retiring the mortgage in case of in service death to the 
amount present public servant benefits payable on death would not do so);
b. determination o f which categories of public servants should be housed why and 
where (if rural/small town and/or quarters categories are agreed) through provision 
of/access to government housing;
c. the implications for selling off existing surplus eligible/entitled urban housing
(probably with preference to present occupiers and with access to a mortgage scheme 
analogous to “a” but taking account of their fewer years to retirement and their 
commuted pension entitlement at retirement);
d. the potential for partial contracting out o f management and maintenance of
government housing particularly in large towns and cities as discussed in Paras. 55-62 
above.
73. For the avoidance of doubt it is assumed the new 15%-20% rates will be deemed for 
Income Tax purposes not to provide any taxable subsidy - a position analogous to the 
historic position of the 5%-10%-15% system.
74. Presumably government would wish to require autonomous public agencies (e.g. 
Tanzania Tax Authority, LART, Universities, Reference Hospitals, Bank of Tanzania to 
adopt analogous strategies rates, categories and transitional arrangements.
75. Hazina might wish to consider the (necessarily phased as existing tenants retired or 
otherwise left the service) disposal of surplus entitled/eligible housing together with 
the disposal of most NHC/RoB premises. Phased auctions (with reserve prices), first 
refusal at highest bid or reserve price (whichever is higher) to sitting tenants, access to 
mortgages (perhaps on a basis roughly analogous to that of public servants but taking 
account of the greater risk of default) for persons buying homes in which they are to 
reside. Phasing is proposed to avoid a market glut and/or inadequate mortgage finance 
availability. The probability that such a broad strategic approach to all public sector 
housing provision would be of interest to Hazina turns on the clear impracticability, of 
NHC/RoB playing a leading role (quantitatively at least) in housing provision because of 
their limited managerial capacities and their present and foreseeable future lack of access
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to finance to undertake the massive rehabilitation/deferred maintenance programme 
needed for their present building stocks. (In many cases - primarily but by no means all 
commercial - the main present value is not the deteriorated building but the low, fixed 
rental term lease for the plot on which it stands).
76. Studies needed for keeping policy up to date and - in some cases - for articulating initial 
policy decisions include:
a. typical household rent (absolute and as % of income) for urban large and medium 
enterprise and - to extent feasible - small and ‘informal’ (unrecorded) enterprise 
employees. The purpose would be to identify whether a 20% of salary housing charge 
(15% in cases in which a distinct government purpose element and/or a case for an 
incentive to live in a non-urban area was present) was reasonable. If a higher rate 
were to be deemed appropriate, it would need to be phased in so the study is not 
needed prior to deciding on increases to 20%/15%;
b. a survey/study of low and middle (as well as upper middle) home construction costs 
not only by large and small ‘formal’ (recorded) sector contractors but also by fundi led 
construction teams supervised by the resident to be which are standard Swahili 
housebuilders and common up to middle (and perhaps upper middle) income level. 
There are virtually no recent data beyond the larger contractors (who are upper 
income, expatriate, large enterprise and government oriented) and there never has 
been a systematic study of ‘informal’ (unrecorded) contracting costs of building even 
though it is known to build the majority of urban residential housing and to charge 
buyers less (presumably in large part because buyers act as their own quantity 
surveyors and construction supervisors thus cutting out a massive chunk of larger 
‘form al’ contractor overhead costs);
c. government housing stock numbers, categories, condition and locations. The
categories could be prestige of office, quarters, access to rental housing and general 
eligible/entitled without prejudice as to future decisions on coverage of these 
categories. This data is needed as a baseline to determine deficits/surpluses once 
categories and numbers covered are agreed upon and to have a rough estimate as to 
repairs backlog;
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d. once categories to he housed are agreed (see Paras. 43-51) then a follow-up study is 
appropriate to identify numbers to be covered, present coverage, deficit (or in
some urban areas surplus in entitled/eligible category) and - if readily accessible - 
replacement unit cost of types of residence/quarters to allow strategies for moving 
toward desired provision levels (and disposal of surpluses);
e. exploration of access to housing mortgages from financial institutions both as to cost 
and as to availability. If - as seems likely - there are market access problems then a 
government guarantee/checkoff scheme linked to POSB or NIC provision of funds 
(see Paras. 36-42, 71) would need to be explored and quantified;
f. Hazina might wish study “e” to be part of a broader study on housing (and other 
property) financing (mortgage, joint venture, etc.) by financial institutions 
especially Pension Funds, POSB and Insurance Companies. These institutions are 
no longer required to invest in government stock, need to invest in low risk/real return 
(i.e. above inflation) instruments and have next to no experience in doing so under 
present conditions. Globally pension funds do invest in property both via mortgages 
and joint ventures, but to do so requires expertise not now in the possession of their 
Tanzanian counterparts. This aspect would be of interest to the Civil Service 
Department if and when (or when) conversion of public service pensions to a 
contributory basis came on the agenda again as, at least in the recent past funded 
investment in government paper schemes have fared even worse than pay as you go 
ones linked to last year (years of employment) pay;
g. an inquiry into actual management and maintenance costs and what there would be 
with full maintenance under government operation and what the options and costs 
of whole or partial spin-off of management/maintenance to an autonomous public 
entity or to one or more private enterprise contractors might be, with proposals on 
how to proceed if either of the options appears attractive;
h. exploring ways and means of selling surplus eligible/entitled housing taking into 
account probable proceeds, mechanism for phased auctions with reserve prices, access 
to mortgages for residential and small business sitting tenants. Hazina might wish 
this to be part of a more general study involving the bulk of present NHC and
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RoB holdings. If these are to be sold - as would appear desirable given the 
impossibility of NHC/RoB raising either the funds of the management resources for 
repair, renovation and redevelopment - the total public sector building sales strategy 
(especially size and implications for phasing related to avoiding overloading the 
limited property finance market) should be considered not separate Works and 
RoB/NHC components.
77. The foregoing studies are not in themselves policy explorations. They are data and 
managerial/operational alternative presentation and analysis exercises assuming that a 
new public service housing strategy is desired and will be based on providing housing 
(except via adequate pay perhaps complemented by facilitation of mortgages) only to 
categories of public servant for whom particular state interests or market constraints 
create special cases for doing so and that such housing provision and should reduce 
radically the present subsidy element as well as improving housing stock 
maintenance and management. They can be carried out after, or in parallel with, 
detailed policy decisions.
78. Except in the case of analysing mortgage schemes property investment/finance (see Para. 
75e) and property sales, qualified Tanzanian consultants should be locatable. On those 
specialised areas so little Tanzanian experience exists that expatriates - if practicable 
from e.g. South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana via CFTC - would be desirable. Each 
study appears to be handleable in no more than three months but some do require that 
another study be done first. Therefore - counting terms of reference, identification, 
commissioning - the entire study process might take 9 to 12 months.
79. Policy issues include:
a. Move to a 20% (15%) of salary charge for housing for new entrants - beginning 1 
July ‘99 parallel to a salary award;
b. Protection of present occupiers by a ‘grandfather clause’ - by definition linked to 
“a” in timing;
c. Definition of categories and numbers to be housed directly by government and of 
desirability of complementary local government and/or user committee/community
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provision of or actions supporter employee acquisition of housing leading to 
identification and sequential prioritisation of phased reduction of gaps in
availability and backlog of overdue maintenance;
d. Provision (if determined to be prudent and practicable) of improved access to 
mortgage finance for public servants - principle for announcement in 1999 Budget 
Speeches with arrangements with POSB/NIC and inauguration to be completed on 1 
January or 1 July 2000;
e. Possibility o f autonomous (public entity or private contractor) management and 
maintenance of all or some (probably basically urban) housing - possible to decide in 
1999 and seek contracts in 2000 but less urgent than a-b-c-d;
f. Ways and means to dispose of surplus housing either alone or as part of a RoB- 
NHC-Govemment disposal programme. Decision possible by 1999 Budget but 
implementation (first sales) unlikely to be feasible before 2000;
80. The main parties to the decision taking and strategy/policy design and articulation
processes should be:
a. Civil Service Department;
b. Hazina;
c. Planning - the overall strategy does have general policy implications which it needs to 
incorporate into its analysis and on which its advice is needed;
d. Prime Minister/President - to approve initial a-b-c-g discussions and broad scope of 
preliminary strategy and steps toward articulation;
e. Bank of Tanzania - financial institution control and research departments;
f. Labour (because of ramifications for employees more generally);
g. Public Service Trade Unions (to maximise understanding, avoid unintended side 
effects, ensure “worker friendly” design);
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h. AG s - Parliamentary Draftsman (both to advise where primary legislation may be 
needed and to draft any such as well as the clearly needed subsidiary legislation);
i. Legislative Committee of Cabinet; 
j. National Assembly.
81. Because government provision of public servant housing is the last main strategic gap in 
the programme for rationalisation and restoration of public servant emoluments decisions 
and initial implementation in this areas are urgent. However, in some sub areas studies 
and programme design could well take 6 to 15 months before operationality. Therefore a 
case exists for:
a. key strategic decision taking by 1 June 1999; with
b. 20% (15%) deductions, “grandfather clause” and announcement of other decisions 
(not least mortgage access could be introduced in the 1999/00 Budget Speech (or 
alternatively in 1999/00 as they need to be parallel to salary adjustment);
c. the mortgage access scheme while announceable in the 1999/00 Budget Speech 
probably could not be brought into operation before 1 January 2000;
d. while the strategic priorities for types and locations of direct government housing 
provision could be decided by mid 1999 details statements and programmes on gaps, 
priorities and phased implementation of new construction and maintenance 
backlog elimination could not begin before 2000/01 nor could the 
construction/maintenance catch-up be completed before - say 2004/05.
e. partial contracting out of housing management and maintenance and disposal of 
surplus government housing do not need to be tied to a Budget Session and there is no 
evident significant advantage in announcing a decision in principle long before 
implementation will be possible. The middle of fiscal 1999/00 might be a prudent 
date for detailed decision - announcement - initiation of implementation.
82. It is not evident that any of the proposals of this paper would require primary legislation 
(Acts) although some might require amendments. Several would - or should - require
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subsidiary legislation by Schedules or Orders, preferably Gazetted and laid before the 
National Assembly/subject to its disapproval. While the net financial implications 
(except perhaps closing gaps in stocks and their maintenance) are relatively limited most 
of the proposals will require Budget lines (both Revenue and Expenditure) so that the 
appropriate forum for debate would appear to be in the Assembly during the departmental 
policy portion of the Budget Debate.
83. The importance of prior discussion and o f a meeting of minds with the Public 
Service Trade Union is very high:
a. the chief body of persons affected are its members;
b. the Union’s officers are highly responsible and well aware of the constraints on 
public spending, even though their duty to defend their members’ interests means 
that they and Hazina inevitably diverge on actual numbers (albeit not since 1995 on 
orders of magnitude nor direction);
c. if properly comprehended, the “Grandfather Clause” guarantees against loss of 
present (real) housing benefits while the new 20% (15%) deductions will be 
parallel to annual adjustments and part of overall emoluments strategy not a 
clawback of “vested” benefits nor a cut in overall prospects. Similarly the 
mortgage access while designed to be self financing and - by facilitating public 
servant home ownership - designed to reduce, demand for government houses is a 
genuine response to a frequently and broadly voiced public servant priority for means 
to finance acquisition of own homes;
d. assuming proper presentation, discussion and understanding, the Trade Union 
Officers are the best channel for (correctly) convincing public servants the 
proposals are in their interest and thereby ensuring that they are a support base for 
not an obstacle to, implementation;
e. and - potentially equally important - the details of several of the proposals should 
take into account worker needs and perceptions which the Trade Union can 
collect and channel to the senior civil servants and political decision takers much 
more effectively than consultants or even many senior public servants.
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ANNEX
U n i f o r m e d  S e r v i c e s  - S u m m a r y
1. This paper does not explore in details certain special considerations applying to the 
Uniformed Services.
2. It does apply the principle of direct provision of housing only when a special government 
interest case arises to both Uniformed and ‘Non Uniformed’ Services. In that respect the 
nature of Uniformed Services duties requires that a higher proportion (not self evidently 
100%, that is an empirical issue) of their members need “Quarters” housing than of the 
other ( ‘Non Uniformed’) Services. In that respect the mortgage access scheme could only 
apply to those persons not required by the nature of their duties to reside in “quarters” .
3. In principle 15% of salary rental charges (the reduced rate for housing provided to serve a 
governmental purpose and especially for “quarters”) should apply to the Uniformed 
Services. However, to the extent the 10% deduction does not now apply, implementation 
of the new 15% provision should be deferred - as it would in any case automatically be 
for present occupants under “grandfather clause” .
4. That issue is part of the more general one of systematic differences in Uniformed 
Service emoluments from Non-uniformed Service ones. Initially these differences 
were relatively modest and justified by the 50 year retirement barrier in the Uniformed vs. 
60 year (then) in the Non-Uniformed Services. The differential has risen since the mid- 
1970’s with slower Uniformed Service real pay erosion and different timing and 
modalities of partial restoration. The reasons presumably relate to specific politically 
perceived needs to preserve the loyalty and professionalism of the Uniformed (and armed) 
Services. These can hardly be addressed plausibly as a sub topic of Public Service 
Housing provision!
5. The lumping of Police with Army (Armed Forces) is an historic fact. The initial reasons 
were simplicity and avoidance of tensions between Army and Police. It is not self evident 
that duties of the two services are so similar as to require the continuation of the present 
approach. Civil Police forces (and Tanzania’s police force is very much a civil police 
with quite low riot and organised crime - e.g. cattle theft - control components) are in fact
very different from Armies. Whether a review of this area is desirable is a political issue 
and there is no apparent present urgency for such a review. However, an earlier 
introduction of Housing Charges - say 10% for barracks and 15% other - may be 
practicable for police though probably only with a special 10% increment at entry post 
base to scales, because new entrants are now oused as a general policy which does not 
apply to the non-uniformed services.
6. The simplest approach - especially initially - is to include the Uniformed Services only in 
respect to “Quarters” (needs, availabilities) issues.
7. In the medium term a broader exploration of the issues at Paras. 4 and 5 may be seen as 
desirable. Realistically that would require a working party of Defence plus Service 
Commanders, Police, Hazina, Civil Service, Prime M inister’s chaired by the last. 
Explorations could be at senior official level but all terms of reference and final decisions 
would necessarily be at political (Ministerial/Prime Ministerial).
A M o r e  D e t a i l s  In t r o d u c t i o n  T o  Is s u e s
8. The preceding memo has been set out in general terms. As noted, in principle it applies 
to all public servants including the uniformed services - basically Civil Police plus Armed 
Forces. In practice it certainly applies to all non-uniformed services and - with minor 
modifications - should be applicable to Civil Police housing provision. How to apply it to 
Armed Forces housing may pose more questions. In both cases the other divergences of 
non uniformed/uniformed in kind free or heavily subsidised remuneration in kind - 
notably meals - pr9bably should be looked at in parallel. The Armed Services and 
probably the Civil Police could have their housing policy reviews slightly later than the 
non-uniformed services with decisions (not necessarily identical) in 2000 or 2001.
9. In the case of the Civil Police there is no reason in principle to adopt a different charging 
system than for non-uniformed public servants. Provision of quarters - whether barracks 
(officer rooms/communal messing) or cantonments (single or family housing with 
cooking facilities) is the norm (with a fairly high present proportion of away from post
housing more the result of lack of police quarters and of funds to expand them than of a 
policy shift).
10. However, several questions different - at least in degree - those applying to non­
uniformed services arise:
a. should there be a norm of at post housing provision for the good of the service of 
would the latter be better served by - say - 50% at post and 50% ’norm al’ housing?
b. If the latter is a 15% at post/20% off post split in charges acceptable in terms of 
morale since even with a (near total for serving personnel?) grandfather clause the 
proportion of new entrants effected will be much larger than for the on uniformed 
services? If not the 15% rate would have to be standard for both segments.
c. Is a 15% charge rate (vs. 20% ’norm al’) but 15% ’at post’for non uniformed services) 
likely to create problems for the public service more broadly? The answer may be no 
in that police remuneration is in any event separate scales and these are in general 
more favourable than for the non-uniformed services (nominally on the grounds of an 
earlier retirement rate). This particular colonial legacy - it is by no means universal 
practice in other countries to pay uniformed service personnel more than comparable 
non uniformed - has not in the past appeared to arouse significant discontent either on 
the part of non-uniformed service members of on that of Hazina.
d. To the extent that the new charges were well above existing ones (a question of fact to 
be determined) a special increase in scales, or at least their minimum entry grade base 
levels, might be needed to ensure recruitment was not adversely affected. If this was 
large - e.g. 10% - and resulted in 20% to 25% police base point increases 10% to 15% 
for non-uniformed services substantial Public Service Union (and member) discontent 
could arise unless skilful, frank prior discussions with the Union were held.
e. There are other in kind benefits (at least as seen by outsiders) to Civil Police. Those 
relating to uniforms are readily explicable - they must be worn on duty and are not 
allowed/not suitable for non duty wear. Those in respect to food - meals on duty/mess 
meals - may pose more problems to any regularisation of emoluments. To a degree 
they are provided for the good of the service and charging (even in part given the
historic record and low present pay) would lead to resentment and damage to morale 
out of proportion to fiscal gains. To some degree, however, they are in practice a 
’fringe benefit' and - at least for messing - should be offset by higher pay and a 
messing deduction (not all police mess). In practice the complications and 
resentments suggest now is not the best time to attempt any such reform.
11. On balance a 1999/2000 10% and 15% charge (perhaps 10% barracks 15% cantonments 
and off post housing) on new entrants plus a special 10% increase in the base level of 
entry point pay scales would appear optimal if practicable. However, if serious 
complexities are discovered on closer study or widespread officer opposition/morale 
problems are likely a longer consultation/review process aimed at 2000/2001 or 
2001/2002 introduction would be preferable either to holding up the basic non-uniformed 
service police reforms or imposing a sharply opposed change.
12. For purposes of this aide memoire fire services are assumed to be non-uniformed. As 
they are very small, if their actual conditions are more analogous to Civil Police they 
could readily be deferred if police are. The Armed Forces pose problems/differences 
parallel to Civil Police but greater in degree and n magnitude (if only because the 
numbers involved are twice as large and the perceived degree of separation from civilian 
services much greater).
13. In principle charges for housing (especially cantonment and off base) are desirable. For 
practical and internal morale reasons 10% (barracks)/15% (other) would appear the least 
problematic rates. In practice this would require raises in entry point scale bases to offset 
the large immediate cost to new entrants (who would - presumably - all be housed and, 
therefore, affected at once - a situation totally different to that of the non-uniformed 
services). In practice both institutional and individual objections as well as objective 
complexities almost certainly mean a separate review with a 2001/2002 target date for 
decision would be prudent and the possibility of no short or medium term reform - while 
not a foregone conclusion - a real one.
14. Similarly in respect of meals the proportion of genuine needs of service provision, the 
historic tradition and the probable morale problems strongly suggest setting the issue to 
one side quite possibly even to the extent of not initiating any immediate review.
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15. The problems of reform in this the uniformed services sector (and especially the Armed 
Forces) are compounded by the historic reality:
a. the Civil Service Department (naturally) has no experience with nor working 
knowledge of their scales and other conditions which fall outside its remit;
b. Home Affairs - which has both uniformed) Police) and non-uniformed employees 
does not appear to have devoted much consideration to scale and other condition 
divergences let alone considered to what extent they continued to be justified;
c. Hazina has also devoted little attention to conditions other than pay of uniformed 
services. In the case of pay it has in general accepted higher scale for uniformed 
services (especially Armed Forces) and, at times, higher scale increases on somewhat 
vaguely parametered "security" grounds. Its chief constraining tool has been overall 
budgetary ceilings which - at least indirectly - do limit pay, provisioning, uniforming 
and housing;
d. Defence has not pursued cost control or broader economic evaluation of pay scales 
and other benefits (or for that matter of other expenditures). In particular it has taken 
in kind housing and food provision as a given and never evaluated whether and to 
what extent more pay and less in kind payments might be more efficient in terms of 
personnel morale and efficient.
These attitudes and analytic gaps may need to be modified. But they have existed, do 
exist and so long as they remain do make it harder to compile a data base and - even more 
- to hold rationale discussion on the gains and costs of housing provision/charging (or, for 
that matter, any other reform). They are not unique to Tanzania nor to Africa but - to 
varying degrees - apply to uniformed service emoluments and conditions and their 
analysis in almost all countries. This is not a reason to rule out reforms per se but a 
warning to begin with data collection and analysis shifts and to adopt a different time 
scale than for the non-uniformed services.
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